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Summary
In 1969, British psychoanalyst John Bowlby founded a scientific theory, which is now known 
as “an attachment theory” in which he proposed that keeping physical proximity with caregiving 
adults represents primary mechanism of child safety regulation and survival. As the theory evol-
ved, due to the new pespectives gained by other fields of research such as biology, neuroscience 
and developmental psychology, everyday experience of working psychoanalysts showed also to 
be very useful in explaining how the psychologic attachment develops in humans. In this proce-
ss, one of the most important concepts is mentalization that can be roughly defined as process of 
taking views that observe the intention, which means an approach to humans as beings guided 
by intrinsic intents. For this process to be effective, a person must have satisfactory capacity to 
mentalize, which finally leads to the development of mature “self”. Ever-growing knowledge in 
this field of research should eventually establish theoretically sound and truly evidence-based 
clinical practices, working in harmony with a research literature that is sensitive to clinical dis-
coveries and applications. In this paper, we review attachment theory in the light of this new 
research, with hope of applying it to psychoanalytical practice for the benefit of the patients. 
Keywords: attachment theory; mentalization; intesubjectivity; “self”.
BOWLBY’S  ETHOLOGY – EVOLUTIONAL ATTACHMENT THEORY
Bowlby and Ainworth’s attachment theory is one of the most successful psyc-
hological theories of the past half century [1,2]. It has generated thousands of pu-
blished studies and scores of books.
Attachment theory as such is psychological, evolutional and ethological theory 
that researches inter-human relationships. Founder of this theoretical approach is 
psychiatrist and psychoanalyst John Bowlby. He improved multidisciplinary per-
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spective in which psychoanalysis, ethology, sociobiology and psychobiology is inte-
grated in cybernetic theory of the system control with modern structural cognitive 
development backed up by neuroscientific research. 
In 1969 he proposed that keeping physical proximity with caregiving adults re-
presents primary mechanism of child safety regulation and survival. In Bowlby’s 
theory, behaviour patterns that have predictable outcome of increasing proximity 
between child and the caregiver (for instance cry, invocation, following, cuddling) 
represent an action of complex and instinctive but environmentally conditioned 
control system called “attachment behavioural system”. It is presumed that this sy-
stem developed to serve the biological function of protection of the younger and/
or weaker members of the primate pack that lived on the ground. Once it chooses 
the person with whom it will be attached (generally, but not necessary child’s bi-
ological mother), the child carefully observes where she is, keeping the proximity 
even under non-stressful conditions. If a threatening situation should occur, atta-
chment behavioural system becomes highly active and immediately guides the 
baby towards behaviour that has a goal to establish direct physical nearness and 
contact [2].
Although Bowlby initially introduced an assumption that biological function 
of the attachment behavioural system was primarily protection from the predators, 
full knowledge of this system can best be obtained if we take in concern that it 
serves multiple survival functions. Besides from the protection of the predators, 
physical nearness also protects from the unfavourable temperature changes, natural 
disasters, attacks from the individuals of the same species, as well as the peril of the 
separation from the group [3].
After the introductory articles from 1958 on, Bowlby publishes thorough trilogy 
“Attachment And Loss” from 1969 to 1982 [2,4,5], which made attachment theory 
in upcoming decades a dominant approach in understanding early social develo-
pment, and which initiated the wave of empirical research of model of close re-
lationship forming in the childhood period. In the past, critic mostly came from 
the fields of psychoanalysis and ethology, and pointed out to perceived accent on 
mother. In recent times, critic mainly points out to genetical factors, temperament, 
complexity of the relationships inside the family, and to limitations of discrete cla-
ssification patterns of the attachment behaviour styles.
Attachment behavioural concepts were incorporated inside the existing thera-
peutical interventions, and used to plan psychotherapeutic intervention based upon 
the attachment concept. Attachment theory concepts were also used to formulate 
various social laws, as well as laws in relation with child care.
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ATTACHMENT PATTERNS IN CHILDREN
Next great pioneer in attachment theory research was Mary Ainsworth, de-
veloped well known laboratory based procedure for observation of child intrinsic 
working model in action. Children, when separated for a short time from their ca-
regivers in, to them, unknown situations, show one of the four behaviour patterns. 
Children classified as “Secure”, willingly explore in the presence of their primary 
caregivers, show anxiety in the presence of strangers, avoiding them, and express 
sadness because of the current absence of their caregivers, afterwards repeatedly 
seeking contact with caregivers that calms them. Those children have no problem 
with returning to the experiment. It is possible that some children, which show 
themselves to be less anxious because of the separation, will not seek nearness of 
parents or caregivers after the separation, and it is possible that they will not pre-
fer parent or caregiver over stranger; these are classified as “Anxious-avoidant”. 
Third category of children, “Anxious-resistant”, show limitations in exploration and 
playing and are prone to express great sadness due to the separation, and have great 
problems in calming down after the separation, resist, become stiff, continue to cry 
or passively resist. Parent’s or caregiver’s presence or an attempt to comfort the child 
fails, and its anxiety and rage make alleviation and relief that can only be acquired 
through nearness, impossible [1].
Mary Main and Inge Bretherton independently draw attention to something that 
a philosopher Dennett would call “an intentional stance”. In 1987, Dennett indicated 
that people try to understand each other in frames of the mental states: thoughts 
and feelings, beliefs and wishes, in the desire to give a meaning, or what is more 
important, to predict the actions of the others. If a child succeeds to explain mother’s 
obvious rejecting behaviour as an emotion of sadness due to the loss, it will be pro-
tected from confusion and negative view of itself, and will not show helplessness 
because that situation happened [6]. 
The characteristic and acquisition of “the intentional stance” is child’s recogni-
tion that behaviour can be based upon false beliefs. That happens around the age 
of three or four. Developmental theorists designed a great deal of tests for detecting 
the quality of false beliefs understanding and refer to these capacities as “the theory 
of mind”.
MENTALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF “SELF”
Mentalization is a term introduced by French psychosomatic states theorists, 
but the concept started to develop in different directions in the 1980s [7,8]. In the 
literature that deals with cognitive development, it is interchangeably used and in 
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the same context with more frequent and more expanded concept of “the theory of 
mind”. This term is made by primatologists Premak and Woodruff in 1978 [9] and is 
applied in the developmental psychology, in terms of the child’s capacity to ascribe 
thoughts, feelings, ideas and intentions to other persons and anticipate and influen-
ce their behaviour. Most of the developmental research that took place during the 
1980s and 1990s were conducted in terms of the mind theory concept. Research that 
used false-belief task detection, used the results either for normative mapping of the 
development of the mind theory in pre-school children, or to demonstrate deficien-
cies of the same theory in persons with autistic disorder. As Baron-Cohen proposed 
in 2000, the test of detecting false-belief is the first-order test in the theory of mind, 
and includes concluding about mental status of other person (“She thinks that...”). 
Second-order test of the theory of mind includes concluding about the perspective 
of the second order that has been interposed in the mental state (“She thinks that he 
thinks that…”) [10]. 
During the last decade, the construction of the theory of mind and its paradigm 
contained in the false-belief test, was criticized to be too narrow [11]. That guided 
some of the authors to change the term with “mentalizing”, because it is somewhat 
more general and not limited to a specific task or an age group [12]. 
One of the most bitter attempts to expand the concept of the theory of mind 
beyond the false-belief paradigm, beyond autism, and finally beyond the pre-school 
children study comes from Peter Fonagy and his cooperates. In their definition of 
mentalizing, it can be used interchangeably with the theory of mind or social intelli-
gence, although it refers to a lot more than the sole theory of mind [13,14].
Mentalizing refers to a process of taking views that observe the intention, whi-
ch means an approach to humans as beings guided by intrinsic intents [15]. Allen 
points out that mentalization can be conscious or unconscious. When we talk abo-
ut conscious (explicit mentalizing), it is closely related to language and therefore 
powered or limited by our verbal capabilities. The unconscious mentalizing (impli-
cit mentalizing) can happen instantly, without our supervision and conscious inter-
ference, and can be perceived to be without our general intellectual development. 
For instance, without our conscious intention, through our facial expression or body 
talk, we are able to recognize in other people certain mental states that help us to 
explain their behaviour. Implicit mentalization is therefore procedural, and we are 
always acting upon it without even thinking about it [16].
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INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERENCE OF MENTALIZATION 
CAPACITY 
Phenomenon of capacity to imagine mental states as an explanation of the beha-
viour, both its own and of the others, is basic organizing construct of the approach 
to social development that has mentalization in its focus. In research studies the 
term that is often used to express measurable, quantifying index of mentalization in 
context of attachment concept is reflective function [13,14].
Capacity to mentalize, together with capacity to regulate the affect and also the 
control mechanisms of attention represent key designations of “self” organization. 
Capacity to mentalize is acquired in context of the early attachment relationship. 
Therefore, impairments in early attachment can disturb normal development of 
these essential socio-cognitive relationships and create a profound vulnerability in 
context of social relations.
The ability to understand oneself as a mental factor develops from the interper-
sonal experience, especially from the relationship with primary objects [17]. Child’s 
understanding of itself as someone that has mind or personality is not given by 
genetics: it develops from the breastfeeding period, through childhood, and this 
development essentially depends on the interaction with more mature minds, pre-
suming that they are well-intentioned, reflexive and well-coordinated. Mentalizati-
on also includes auto-reflexive and interpersonal component. It is backed up with 
great number of specific cognitive skills, including the understanding of emotional 
states, attention and directed effort control, capacity to make a judgement about 
subjective states, as well as explicit reasoning about states of the mind - all of which 
we call adequate mentalization. In combination, these functions enable the child to 
differentiate intrinsic from extrinsic reality, and inner mental and emotional proce-
ss from the interpersonal happenings.
Evolutionary biologist Richard Alexander in 1989. proposed a model of human 
brain development that suggests that our unique intelligence evolved not for the 
reason of facing the aggressive forces of nature, but to face the competition of other 
humans. This more advanced evolution happened only after we reached relative 
dominance over our environment. At this stage of the development we were already 
“the aggressive force of the nature”. In order to meet the challenge of the survival of 
our genes, those with common genetic material had to cooperate considerably more 
before complete development of the high intelligence took place [18]. 
Parents with more developed reflective function are more capable to initiate and 
build up secure attachment in child. In Fonagy’s longitudinal research that com-
prised of 92 children, share of securely attached children was two times higher in 
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group that was successful in overcoming the false-belief task, in relation to group 
that did not. Reflective function of mothers was also connected to the success of 
children. 80% of children, whose mothers had above average reflective function, 
passed the false-belief task, in contrast with 56% of children of mothers that had 
below average reflective function. Reflective function of caregivers is predictive for 
trustworthy attachment, which we can confirm the existence of intergenerational 
transference of the capacity for reflective function, e.g. mentalization. Attachment 
with father has also proved to be important in this developmental achievement [19]. 
Reliable attachment in the relationship provides adequate context for child’s explora-
tion of the caregiver’s mind, and also teaches it about mental function and processes 
of others and itself. Philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel indicated: “Only 
via exploring the mind of someone-else, the child can build up the understanding 
of the nature of mental states”. Process is intersubjective; the child cognizes the 
mind of its caregiver, while the caregiver tries to understand the state of mind or 
the child and to keep it in the process of the mentalization, and finally, to reflect 
this mentalized material to the child. Psychoanalysts Donald Winnicott and Wilfred 
Bion also recognized primary intersubjectiveness in their concepts of mirroring and 
containment
THE SOCIAL ACQUISITION OF SOCIAL COGNITION
Aforementioned evolutionary neurobiological considerations imply that social 
environment that takes care of the child, plays a crucial role in the development of 
social cognition. In its first months, the child starts to understand that it is a physical 
agent, whose actions can contribute to changes in bodies with which it has direct 
physical contact [20]. Parallelly, child’s understanding of itself as a social agent also 
develops. Through interaction with the caregiver, since its birth, the newborn learns 
that its behaviour influences behaviour and emotions of the caregivers, e.g. that he is 
a social agent which can through communicating cause effects with distance in the 
social environment [21]. Both of these early forms of self-consciousness are probably 
develop through activity of the inborn mechanisms of compatibility detections that 
enable the newborn analysis of the possible connections between its actions and 
exogenous stimuli [22]. 
Child’s initial preoccupation with perfectly response-contingent stimulation, 
assured with the help of proprioceptive sensory feedback which are always gene-
rated by its own actions, enable the child to differentiate its mediatory agentive self 
as a separate entity in the environment and construction of primary representation 
of the physical self.
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In the age of 3 to 4 months, the newborn transits form the phase of preference 
of perfect contingency to the phase of high, but not complete contingency, which is 
the level of contingency that is characteristic to adapted empathic mirroring of the 
parents or caregivers onto the newborn’s emotions presentation [23]. Repeated expe-
riences of such affective-reflective reactions of their caregivers is essential for the be-
ginning of the differentiation in order for the newborn to commence to differentiate 
its inner self states: process that has been called bio-social feedback [24].
Securing such state of the reflective environment and save relationship with the 
caregiver can significantly contribute to the creation of the early mentalization capaciti-
es, allowing the newborn exploration or finding its own psychological self in the social 
world. Discovering representational or psychological self, what can be considered to be 
complete mentalization, is most probably based upon the same mechanism [25].
Here, we will take an example of the development of understanding the affects. Let 
us presume that, in the beginning, newborns are not introspectively aware of the diffe-
rences between the affective states. Their representations of these emotions are primari-
ly based upon the stimuli from the outside world. Newborns learn how to differentiate 
inner patterns of physiological visceral stimuli that follow different emotions by obser-
ving facial or vocal mirroring reactions of their caregivers on those stimuli [26] 
At the beginning, the newborn starts to associate its own control over mirroring 
that the parents offer, which results in the improvement of its own emotional status, 
and finally leads to experiencing self as regulating as well as mediating agent. Se-
condly, establishing second-order representation of the affective states creates basis 
for the affect regulation and control of the impulses: affects can be manipulated and 
released internally, as well as through action, and also be experienced as something 
recognizable, and therefore common and mutually shared. If parents do not express 
affects concurrently and compatible with the affect of the newborn, it can disrupt 
adequate signification of the inner states, which will therefore remain confusing, 
experienced as non-symbolized and hard to regulate.
If the ability to understand and regulate the expression of the emotions should 
evolve, two conditions must be fulfilled: 
(a) acceptable compatibility of the mirroring by which the caregiver could correctly 
pair the newborn’s mental status.
(b) signifying role of the mirroring, in which the caregiver can express affect and in 
the same time not to express its own feelings [27].
Two difficulties can arise from those two premises:
(I) in the case of incompatible mirroring, representation of the inner self of the 
newborn will not be compatible with constitutional status of the self and ten-
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dency to narcissistic structure can be established, in analogy with Winnicott’s 
concept of false self [28].
(II) in the case of undesignated mirroring, emotional expressions of parents or ca-
regivers can be seen as an externalization of the newborn’s experience and pre-
disposition for experiencing emotions through other people can be established 
(just as it is the case in the borderline structure of personality, which uses ma-
ssive projections as a basic defense model), (Fig. 1).
Affective expression compatible with the child’s status, but deprived of the si-
gnifying information with which the parent in the mirroring process establishes 
symbolical meaning can overwhelm the newborn. Without the signifying addition 
of the parent, the child feels that those are real emotions of the parents, thus crea-
ting an impression that the child’s experience is transferable, which further, before 
regulating the child’s state, leads to excitement. Reliable caregiver tranquilizes the 
child by combining mirroring with expression that is not compatible with child’s 
feeling, thus combining affective contact and affective distance that settles the affect 
of the child and does the designatory move to symbolical. Such formulation of the 
sensitivity has much in common with Bion’s point of view about the capacity of 
mother to mentally contain affective status that considers unbearable for the child, 
and reacts in the way that confirms the mental status of the child, but in the same 
time serves to adapt the unbearable feelings [29]. Well regulated affects in the pa-
rent-child pair, internalized in the child make a foundation for safe attachment and 
Figure 1. Model of the development of social acquisition and cognition 
according to Fonagy et al. [13]  
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internal working model [30]. Data resulted from the London Parent-Child Project 
about the quality of the reflective function of each parent during pregnancy, showed 
that reflective function is a predictor of later attachment of the child [31]. But, this 
knowledge is somewhat limited because only AAIRF has been investigated in rela-
tion to child’s attachment [32,33]. Therefore, the capacity of the parents to mentalize 
measured in relation to their own childhood and their capacity to similarly influen-
ce their children is more presumed than apparent.
DEFENSES AND ATTACHMENT-RELATED SOURCES OF PAIN AND 
DISTRESS
The concept of psychological defense has been important to psychology ever 
since Breuer and Freud [34] first explained how repression works: “The basis for 
repression can only be a feeling of unpleasure, the incompatibility between the sin-
gle idea that is repressed and the dominant mass of ideas constituting the ego” (p. 
116). 
Almost 110 years later, we [35] con- ducted two experiments in they shows that 
avoidant individuals used some combination of unconscious (repression) or con-
scious censoring (suppression) and self-image inflation to ward off painful thoughts 
of rejection and abandonment, but these defenses were defeated by an interfering 
cognitive load.
These studies, and hundreds of others, both classic and recent [36], indicate 
that: 
1. Breuer and Freud were right in believing that the human mind is capable of re-
pressing unpleasant thoughts (including thoughts about relationship losses and 
negative self-traits). 
2. At least sometimes (e.g., when rejection experiences and negative self-traits are 
associatively linked in memory), repression involves “a psychical group” of re-
lated mental representations (or a neural network, as Freud, a neurologist, might 
also have conceptualized such psychical groups)
3. Repression requires mental effort (psychic energy, in Freud’s terms)
4. The concept of defense is alive and well in present-day psychology, despite hav-
ing been criticized over the decades.
The term defense was quite familiar and acceptable to Bowlby [5], a psychoana-
lyst and the founder of attachment theory. It has not, however, seemed completely 
acceptable to many research psychologists since Bowlby’s time, so it is continually 
being resurrected under names such as coping strategies [37] and strategies of affect 
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regulation or emotion regulation [38]. In line with what all of these concepts have in 
common, defenses are mental mechanisms aimed at adaptation and self-regulation 
a view shared by psychoanalytic writers [39].
What is being defended against in a particular case may be as different as poten-
tially uncontrollable impulses (which Freud viewed as instinctive, but which may 
arise from almost any motive, wish, or desire); a feeling of falling apart under stress 
(losing the coherence and solidity of the sense of self); negative emotions (e.g., anxi-
ety, shame, guilt, fear, anger); and unacceptable thoughts about the self (e.g., about 
one’s own mortality, mistakes, personal weaknesses, or social unacceptability) 
and others (e.g., about another person’s indifference, rejecting behavior, or threats 
of abandonment). Although threatening experiences have been conceptualized in 
many ways—for example, as threatening one’s life, one’s self-control, one’s social 
acceptance, one’s self-image, or one’s sense of coherence and consistency [40]—all 
of the conceptualizations are compatible with the claim that they involve “a feeling 
of unpleasure [attributable to] the incompatibility between the single idea that is 
repressed and the dominant mass of ideas constituting the ego” [34].
According to attachment theory [2,4,5], the unavailability or non-optimal re-
sponsiveness of a primary attachment figure in times of need, as well as the result-
ing disruption of one’s sense of safety, security, and protection, is a major source 
of psychological suffering. When an attachment figure proves to be uninterested, 
unavailable, unempathic, unhelpful, or even frightening, a person in need fails to 
regulate the distress that has activated his or her attachment system (due, e.g., to an 
unexpected loud noise in infancy, an insulting comment by an elementary school 
teacher in childhood, the breakup of a romantic relationship in adolescence, or a 
miscarriage or serious physical illness in adulthood), and the distress is exacerbated 
by frustration of the person’s attachment needs and the rejection of his or her efforts 
to seek love, understanding, comfort, and protection. As a result, the person not 
only feels vulnerable and anxious while trying to handle the threatening experience 
without the assistance of what Bowlby called a “stronger and wiser” attachment 
figure; the person also feels rejected and demeaned or humiliated. This complex of 
feelings, or state of mind, can take at least two organized forms [1,41,42] or be seri-
ously disorganized.
In one organized state of mind, attention is focused mainly on the ways in which 
one’s bids for proximity and support fail to achieve a positive interpersonal result 
(closeness, love, comfort), and instead typically result in a negative outcome (inat-
tention, rejection, anger, disdain, abuse) for showing vulnerability or need. In such 
cases, reliance on an attachment figure, and involvement in a dependent or interde-
pendent relationship more generally, is construed as frustrating, demeaning, and 
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painful. Under these conditions, a person may decide, consciously or unconsciously, 
to rely on him- or her- self—becoming what Bowlby [2] called compulsively self-
reliant, and what others have called dismissive of attachment or simply avoidant (of 
intimacy, closeness, and interdependence). 
This stance can be conceptualized in terms of deactivation of the attachment 
system. Anything that would normally activate the system, such as physical or psy-
chological threats to the self, feelings of vulnerability, or wishes for an attachment 
figure’s protection or support, is defended against, suppressed, countered with nar-
cissistic self- enhancement, or denied [3,43-45]. 
The other organized state of mind that can develop in response to unreliable or 
unresponsive care includes ineffective regulation of distress and construing oneself 
as inadequately supported, insufficiently loved, vulnerable to uncontrollable threats, 
and improperly or unfairly treated. In this state of mind, attention is focused on one’s 
own vulnerability and inadequacy in the threatening situation, which can be momen-
tarily accepted (“I’m hopelessly alone,” “I’m worthless”) and/or raged against (“He’s 
never there for me,” “She promised me this would never happen”). This state of mind 
encourages anxiety, rumination, catastrophizing, jealousy, and envy, and can lead to 
increased efforts to capture a relationship partner’s attention and loyalty (by acting se-
ductive, being coy, or submitting to otherwise undesirable requests) and/or to attempts 
to coerce the partner into behaving more supportively (by making demands, express-
ing strong negative feelings, denigrating rivals, or spying on the partner). Ainsworth 
et al. [1] identified one group of infants who displayed both of these kinds of behavior 
(strong proximity seeking and angry contact resistance) following a brief laboratory 
separation from the parent; these infants were initially labeled anxious-ambivalent. 
In adults, this state of mind is what Main and her colleagues [46] called enmeshed and 
preoccupied with attachment, and what we call, more simply, anxious attachment. 
Theoretically, this state involves hyper-activation of the attachment system [47,48]. Al-
though these two states of mind, avoidance and anxiety, are related, both being due to 
insecurity caused by an attachment figure’s unavailability or unreliability, their rela-
tive strength may vary across situations, relation- ships, and individuals. Mikulincer 
et al. [42] summarized the broad array of internal and external factors that contribute 
to the relative strength of each of the states of mind. 
The avoidant stance is encouraged by: 
1. Consistent inattention, rejection, or angry disapproval on the part of an atta-
chment figure in response to a person’s bids for proximity and support.
2. Threats of punishment or rejection if the person makes a bid for proximity, inti-
macy, or protection.
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3. Traumatic or abusive experiences during proximity-seeking efforts.
4. Explicit or implicit encouragement on the part of an attachment figure for one’s 
greater self-reliance and suppression of expressions of need or vulnerability.
The anxious stance or state of mind is encouraged by:
1. Unreliable care, which is sometimes affectionate and at other times neglectful.
5. Intrusive care that is more related to the caregiver’s own needs and anxieties 
than to the needs of the attached individual.
6. Care that discourages the acquisition of self-regulation skills and, directly or 
indirectly, punishes a person for attempting to function independently.
7. Comments that emphasize a person’s helplessness, incompetence, or weakness 
when trying to operate autonomously.
8. Traumatic or abusive experiences endured when one is separated from attach-
ment figures. This kind of treatment causes a person to feel ambivalent because, 
on the one hand, relying on the attachment figure is awkward, discomforting, 
and sometimes annoying, but on the other hand, trying to care for oneself can 
seem dangerous or hopeless and therefore daunting. This kind of care may en-
courage a person to verbalize neediness and protest temporary abandonment 
(real or imagined), because making noise has sometimes recaptured a neglectful 
or self-preoccupied caregiver’s attention. This encourages inauthentic emotion-
ality-a form of behavior that can be humorous or endearing, but that can also 
seem dishonest and become exhausting for anyone who tries to respond help-
fully to it.
The most insecure state of mind, disorganized attachment, seems to stem from 
experiences with an attachment figure who was either seriously abusive, frightened, 
or frightening when a person sought proximity and safety from the attachment fig-
ure [41,49]. These experiences turn what should have been a safe haven and secure 
base into a source of threat, causing all organized attachment strategies to break 
down. Thus the individual’s biologically based tendency to turn to an attachment 
figure in times of trouble is countered by the biologically based tendency to turn 
away from threat, and the individual is literally stuck. In childhood, these incom-
patible tendencies lead to unusual behavior—lying down on the floor in the midst of 
seeking proximity, veering off course when approaching the parent and going un-
der a table, backing away from the parent while in obvious distress, or freezing. In 
adulthood, the equivalent state can involve odd beliefs, dissociative states, extreme 
lack of trust in others, and a lack of monitoring of discourse or reasoning.
The different insecure states of mind have implications for the kinds of defen-
sive behavior a person is likely to exhibit. Individuals who score high on avoidant 
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attachment tend to be vigilant about becoming needy, intimate, dependent, or emo-
tional; they deny vulnerability, emphasize their personal strengths, avoid threats, 
and resist becoming dependent on anyone. Individuals who score high on anxious 
attachment, in contrast, tend to be vigilant about possible neglect, rejection, or aban-
donment, and to be hypersensitive to signs of danger and lack of care. This can 
cause them either to act out noisily and intrusively, or to comply submissively with 
relationship partners’ requests. If necessary to gain support, they will admit (and 
perhaps even exaggerate) their own weaknesses and vulnerabilities, criticize them-
selves, and attempt to remake themselves (e.g., by undergoing cosmetic surgery) 
[50]. That is, whereas avoidantly attached people are worried about intimacy, en-
gulfment, and interdependence, anxiously attached people are worried about sepa-
ration, abandonment, isolation, and interpersonal distance.
Although not all aspects of this theoretical analysis of defenses have been em-
pirically tested, there is good evidence that avoidant people are intimacy-averse. 
Self-reported avoidant attachment is associated with higher scores on fear-of-inti-
macy scales [51,52], with placing relationship partners at a greater distance from 
one’s “core self” [53], and with actually increasing physical distance from others, 
even in fairly simple settings. Kaitz et al. [54], for example, used a stop-distance 
research paradigm in which people rated their level of discomfort as an experi-
menter moved toward them. They also assessed the physical distance freely chosen 
by participants when seated facing an experimenter and talking about personal is-
sues. More avoidant people were less comfortable with physical proximity, disliked 
having the experimenter move into their personal space, and sat significantly fur-
ther away from the experimenter when given that option. Dismissingly avoidant 
attachment, as measured with the AAI [55], involves conversational tactics designed 
to maintain distance from the interviewer, such as not answering questions, engag-
ing in long pauses, and failing to provide details necessary for the interviewer to 
understand the speaker’s history.
Regarding anxious attachment, several studies have shown that anxious adults 
score higher than average on rejection sensitivity [56,57], are quicker to recognize 
rejection-related words in lexical decision tasks, and have difficulty inhibiting 
thoughts of rejection [58,59]. Baldwin and Kay [58] exposed people to sounds (pure 
tones) paired with rejecting (frowning) or accepting (smiling) faces, and then ad-
ministered a lexical decision task in which rejection-related words were paired with 
each of the tones. Non-anxious (i.e., relatively secure) adults were slower to react to 
rejection-related words when they were paired with rejection tones (as compared to 
acceptance tones), but anxious people reacted faster to these words even in the pres-
ence of the acceptance tone. That is, anxious people were so sensitive to rejection-
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related cues that they were unable to dispense with worries about rejection even in 
accepting contexts.
In another series of experiments, Mikulincer et al. [60] obtained indirect support 
for the idea that anxiously attached people construe an attachment figure’s unavail-
ability as a sign of their own helplessness and vulnerability. Participants were asked 
to imagine being separated from a loved one and then to perform a word com-
pletion task that measured the accessibility of death-related thoughts. Those who 
scored higher on attachment anxiety reacted to separation reminders with more 
death-related thoughts. This tendency was particularly strong when the imagined 
separation was long-lasting or final. In other words, for anxious individuals, so-
cial or psychological separation evoked thoughts of death. This finding is especially 
interesting in light of Bowlby’s [2] theoretical speculation that the attachment sys-
tem emerged during evolution because it protected primates (especially infants, but 
adults as well) from predation, dangerous accidents, and attacks by hostile others. In 
other words, seeking protection from attachment figures may have been motivated 
by fear of injury and death, and being rejected or abandoned by attachment figures 
might have accurately foreshadowed premature death.
This mental equating of separation and death was also noted by Hart et al. [61], 
who examined defensive reactions to separation and reminders of death. Ameri-
can undergraduates were asked to think about their own death, separation from 
a close relationship partner, or a neutral control theme, and then to report their 
attitudes toward the writer of a pro-American essay provided by the experimenter. 
People who scored relatively high on attachment-related anxiety or avoidance rated 
the pro-American writer more favorably in the death-primed condition than in the 
control condition—the typical defensive reaction to mortality salience [62]. How-
ever, anxious  individuals, but not avoidant ones, also reacted more favorably to the 
pro-American writer in the separation-primed condition. In other words, anxious 
people showed the same defensive reaction (ethnocentric pro-Americanism) to re-
minders of death and separation.
Although anxiously attached adults are unusually afraid of losing a relation-
ship partner, research has shown that they suffer from ambivalence or conflict be-
tween approach and avoidance relational tendencies [63]. On the one hand, they 
are highly motivated to gain a partner’s attention and love. On the other hand, they 
suffer from intense fear of rejection and harbor serious doubts about their ability 
to gain a partner’s love. These fears and insecurities can cause anxious individu-
als to restrain their approach tendencies when they sense a possibility of disap-
proval or rejection. Being caught in an approach–avoidance conflict, they are likely 
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to ruminate obsessively about how to react in social situations, thereby interfering 
with adaptive social behavior. Studies show that anxiously attached people make 
important mistakes in the social realm-at times failing to explain their needs and 
wishes clearly because they fear disapproval, which can make them vulnerable to 
unwanted sexual experiences and hurt feelings [64]; and at other times effusively or 
intrusively expressing their needs and fears to relationship partners [65], which can 
lead to rejection or partner withdrawal. Moreover, these individuals have difficul-
ties both initiating new relationships that might be highly rewarding [66], and being 
able to end troubled or abusive relationships decisively [67].
Perhaps because of Bowlby’s eclecticism, amazingly broad reading, and interest 
in a wide range of empirical studies (ranging from infant cognitive-developmental 
studies to community psychiatry studies of adult depression)-attachment research 
has been methodologically diverse and has benefited from the use of projective, 
observational, self-report, and physiological measures, as well as from cognitive 
and social-cognitive research paradigms. The research literature on attachment is 
exceptionally rich and conducive to diverse clinical applications. We hope that this 
book encourages such applications, which can then be rigorously assessed with ap-
propriate research methods. Eventually we will have theoretically sound and truly 
evidence-based clinical practices, working in harmony with a research literature 
that is sensitive to clinical discoveries and applications. Ever-growing corpus of 
research results and practice based upon experiences of many Bowlby’s psycho-
analytic predecessors and contemporaries equipped psychoanalysts with theoreti-
cal instruments confirmed by verified methodological procedures and made them 
available to psychoanalytical practice for the benefit of the patients.
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Sažetak
Psihoanaliza i teorijska uporišta u istraživanjima na području teorije privrženosti
Godine 1969. britanski psihoanalitičar John Bowlby utemeljio je znanstvenu teoriju koja je 
danas poznata kao “teorija privrženosti” u kojoj tvrdi da je održavanje fizičke bliskosti s odrasli-
ma koji se brinu o djetetu primarni mehanizam regulacije sigurnosti i njegova preživljavanja. 
Kako se teorija razvijala, ponajviše zbog novih gledišta drugih znanstvenih disciplina kao što 
su biologija, neuroznanost i razvojna psihologija, i svakodnevna psihoanalitička praksa poka-
zala se veoma korisnom u objašnjavanju načina na koji se razvija psihološka privrženost u 
ljudi. U tom procesu jedan od najvažnijih koncepata jest mentalizacija, koja se ugrubo može 
definirati kao proces zauzimanja gledišta koja promatraju namjeru, što bi bio pristup ljudima 
kao onima koje vode unutarnje namjere. Da bi taj proces bio učinkovit, osoba mora imati 
zadovoljavajući kapacitet za mentalizaciju, što u konačnici dovodi do razvoja zrelog “selfa”. 
Sve veće svakodnevno znanje o tom znanstvenom polju trebalo bi naposljetku uspostaviti teo-
retski čvrstu kliničku praksu zasnovanu na dokazima, koja će biti u skladu sa znanstvenom 
literaturom osjetljivom na klinička otkrića i kliničku uporabu. U ovom članku dajemo pregled 
istraživanja teorije privrženosti u svjetlu najnovijih otkrića, u nadi da će ih se moći upotrijebiti 
u psihoanalitičkoj praksi radi boljitka pacijenata.
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